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This report discusses the theory of fair division from its history to its uses in 
social sciences.  Fair division goes beyond the envy free solution of the cake cutting 
problem to how people divide chores and rent and allocate assets in a divorce.  Fair 
division can also potentially be used to solve social problems as with voting irregularities. 
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How does one divide an object so that everyone receiving an allocation is happy 
with what they have received?  Is it even possible?   
This dilemma of fair division can be found in the Bible (Numbers 33:54), when 
Moses was told to distribute the land by giving a larger group a larger inheritance, and to 
a smaller group a smaller one.  Allocating an object fairly has long been an issue.  Often 
people are envious of the portion someone else has received.  
This paper explores some of the applications of the fair division algorithm.  
Dubins and Spanier describe fair division as the problem of dividing an object among a 
finite number of people so that each is satisfied that he has received his fair share [6, p.1]. 
One can use fair division to divide an object among n number of people or in the 
case of conflict resolution.  Fair division has been used to allocate assets in a divorce, 
dividing housework, and how much one pays in rent.  The future of fair division likely 
lies in the social sciences and applications to help solve problems of welfare and voting.  
For fair division to be used in dispute resolutions there needs to be further collaboration 
between mathematicians and social scientists.  The two need to be able to work together 
to produce joint research.   
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Fair Division of Cake 
 
ENVY FREE AND PROPORTIONAL MEASURES 
 Disagreements often occur when people are asked to divide an object.  Usually, 
there is envy that one person’s piece is bigger than another.  Is there a way to end the 
disagreement and guarantee that everyone receives a fair share?  Yes, but two properties 
need to exist: envy freeness and proportionality.  Proportionality is a division of a good 




th  of the 
object between n players or of average value.  The next condition needed for fairness is 
for the division to be envy free, or the thought that each player believes her piece is the 
largest or tied for the largest piece or is at least as valuable as any other player’s.  
Efficiency, or pareto-optimal, is defined as the division where no other division increases 
the shares of one player and reduces the share of another [1, p. 268].  
 Let C be an entire cake, where an allocation 
  
A1,A2,...,An  is an n-tuple of 
mutually disjoint pieces.  Assume there are n players, therefore, A1 is Player 1’s piece, A2 
is Player 2’s piece, …,  and An being Player n’s piece.  These pieces are measured m1, m2, 
…, mn to evaluate the pieces of cakes distributed.  In terms of measures, the allocations 





; envy-free if, for all i, j 
= 1, 2, …, n, mi(Ai) 
  
≥ mi(Aj), and efficient if there does not exist an allocation 
  
B1,B2,...,Bn  for each i = 1, 2, …, n, mi(Bi) 
  
≥ mi(Ai) with at least one of the inequalities 
being strict [1, p. 269]. 
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A CASE FOR 2 
In the book, Perplexing Puzzles and Tantalizing Teasers, Martin Gardner poses a 
scenario about siblings Henry and Henrietta splitting a piece of cake [9, p. 21].  Each 
child thinks the other will cut it to give a larger portion to the cutter. The children’s dad 
makes a suggestion on how to cut the cake so that each child is satisfied with the piece 
received.  So what was Dad’s suggestion? 
Dad suggests that the children use the cut and choose method to divide the cake.  
This involves one of the children cutting the cake and the other choosing the first piece.  
The method proves to be fair because the cutter does not have a chance of receiving more 
than half the cake unless she is willing to risk receiving less than half if the chooser takes 
the larger piece [7, p.1].  Using the cut and choose method guarantees that both Henry 
and Henrietta will either be satisfied with the piece received or reduces the envy 
experienced at the other person having a larger piece.   
A CASE FOR 3 
Although the suggestion from Dad answers the question of how to divide a cake 
fairly and proportionally between two people, the next question would be, can it be 
divided between 3 people?  There are several variations of the answer to this question.    
An Extension of Cut and Choose 
The first and most simple answer is an extension of the cut-and-choose method 
from Robertson and Webb [15, p. 112] 
Step 1:  A cuts the cake into what she believes is 1/3 of the cake and 2/3 of the 
cake.   
Step 2:  B cuts the remaining 2/3 of the cake in half. 
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Step 3:  C chooses which piece she believes is the largest.  A chooses from the 
remaining two pieces, and then B takes the last piece.   
 
The problem with using the cut and choose method for 3 people is that B may not 
be satisfied with her piece, either because she may not be happy with the first cut or is 
forced to take a piece she does not want [4, p. 11].  One would say that this method does 
not provide a solution that is either envy-free or proportional.   
The Lone Divider Method 
Steinhaus claims to have solved the problem himself during World War II [7, p. 
2].  Steinhaus was the first person to introduce trimming the cake to assure that each 
piece is proportional [15, p. 114].   The Lone Divider method is illustrated in Figure 1:   



















Although Steinhaus creates a solution that is proportional, it is not necessarily 
envy-free. [4, p. 12].  
The Selfridge-Conway Method 
The Selfridge-Conway method also uses the idea of trimming to allocate the pieces of 




Figure 2.  First Cut by Player A. 
Second, Player B must decide to pass or trim to create a tie for the largest.  In this 
example, Player B decides to trim the cake. 
Figure 3.  Player B Trimming. 
 
The trimming, T, is set aside then Player C chooses a piece.  If Player B trimmed a piece, 
she is required to choose the piece trimmed.  Player A takes the remaining piece.  
However, at this point, only part of the cake has been allocated.  This does create an envy 
free partition of the cake for Player C because she chose first, and for Player B because 
her cut made two of the pieces tied for the largest, and also for Player A because her 








required to have been taken by Player B.  Had Player B passed in the second step the 
allocation of the cake would be complete, however, since this example has Player B trim, 
the player receiving the trimmed piece (Player B) must now cut T into pieces {T1, T2, 
T3} [4, pp. 13-15].  
 
Figure 4.  Trimming of T. 
Player C chooses the first trimming, next Player A, and finally Player B.  Again, 
leaving all players envy free, and feeling as if they each received 1/3 of the cake thus 
creating a proportional allocation of cake as well.    
Dubins and Spanier Moving Knife Solutions 
Although there are different versions of the classic moving-knife procedure, the 
Dubins and Spanier model goes as follows:  A knife is slowly moving at a constant speed 
parallel to itself over the cake.   







As time passes the potential slice of cake increases from 0% to 100% of the cake.  
The first person satisfied with the slice would receive that piece.  If two or more people 
indicate satisfaction with the slice it can be given to any of them.  The process would 
continue with the remaining people and the remaining part of the cake.  The drawback 
with this type of allocation is whether the first person continues to believe that she 
received a fair piece after seeing the remaining pieces being cut [7, p. 2]. 
A CASE FOR N 
After Steinhaus answered the question of how to divide a cake among three 
people, the question was extended to n > 3.  However, Steinhaus was unable to make the 
solution work, and therefore the procedure came from Knaster and Banach.  [5, p. 35].   
The Last Diminisher Method 
Knaster and Banach solve this problem by stating that an individual has two 









th  of the cake [7, p. 2].  Although proportional, the problem that arises is 
when an individual feels that someone else got more than the “fair” share, which brings 
into question the envy freeness using this method.    
Brams and Taylor Method     
The question of whether or not there could be an envy free division among n 
people was left unanswered until Brams and Taylor presented their model of fair division.  
The central feature of the Brams and Taylor method is trimming the pieces of cake.  
However, Brams and Taylor believe that one needs to start the trimming and choosing 
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process with more pieces than there are players, which will lead to envy free allocations.  
[4, p. 14] 
 Brams and Taylor illustrate their method of an envy free protocol for an arbitrary 
n, in this version n = 4, to show that full allocation of the cake can be accomplished in a 
finite number of steps.  [4, pp. 15-16].   
While Player 2 cuts the cake into 4 pieces, she keeps one piece and hands another 
piece to each of the other three players, who are asked whether or not she objects to this 
allocation.  If no one objects, each player keeps the piece given and the procedure is 
done. If there is an objection the objecting player chooses another player’s piece, called 
A, with the original piece being B.  The other two pieces are reassembled and will be 
reallocated later.  Those two players will now go through a series of trim and choose 
among all the players to obtain six total pieces.  Each player will now choose a piece with 
special requirements being placed on the trimmer.  A chosen player will now take the 
first leftover piece, L1, and begin the trim and choose process with that piece, ending in a 
partial allocation of the cake.  This sequence is repeated for the other leftover piece, L2 
and it repeated until the entire cake has been allocated [4, pp. 15 – 17].  
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Fair Division in Conflict Resolution 
 
Fair Division in Divorce 
 
 One of the best uses of fair division is in divorce cases.  This is where Brams’ 
adjusted-winner procedure can be used to allocate assets.  Brams describes the adjusted-
winner (AW) procedure as “a surprisingly simple algorithm of fair division” [11, p. 2].   
Suppose there are two sets of counting numbers: a1, …, aN and b1, …, bN.  The valuations 















In his interview with Jones, Brams describes a demonstration of the adjusted winner 
procedure in a case modeled after the Donald and Ivana Trump divorce case.  The 
procedure gave exactly the same solution as the two lawyers who negotiated for 45 
minutes [9, p. 265]!  An example of the adjusted winner can be found in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Trump Divorce Point Distribution Table. [11] 
Asset Donald's Points Ivana's Points 
Connecticut Mansion 10 38 
Palm Beach Mansion 40 20 
Trump Plaza Apartment 10 30 
Trump Tower Triplex 38 10 
Cash and Jewelry 2 2 
Total 100 100 
 








, share of the first item or 
  
xa1 and B receives 
  
(1− x) 
portion of the first item and all the other items 2, …, N, or 
  
(1− x)b1 + bii=2





N −1∑ , then A receives all the items 1, …, 
  
N −1 and x, where x =
  
1−100
(aN + bN )
 
share of item N; and B receives 
  
(1− x) share of item N, as shown in the table below.   
 
Table 2. Trump Asset Allocation. [11] 
 
Donald's Assets   Ivana's Assets   
Palm Beach Mansion 40 Connecticut Mansion 38 
Trump Tower Triplex 38 Trump Plaza Apartment 30 
Total 78   68 
 
Starting with the first item, increase i up to some value of r which will satisfy either one 








∑     








∑ .   
 (1b) 
 
The initial tallying the points does show a clear “loser.”  One party will clearly be 
dissatisfied and claim the other has more than their fair share.  Adding in the Cash and 
Jewelry still only gives Ivana 70 points to Donald’s 78, again, the claim made is that 
Donald has more.   
To make sure that each party has an equal amount of points, the point ratio is 
calculated and shown in Table 3. 
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Points Point Ratio 
Palm Beach Mansion 40 20 2 
Trump Tower Triplex 38 10 3.8 
 
If there is equality in (1a) then A receives items 1, 2, …, 
  
r −1, and B receives r, 
  
r +1, …, 
N.  However, if there is inequality in (1a), a will receive items 1, 2, …, 
  






ar + br( )
, share of item r, and B will receive (
  
1− x ) share of item r, and 
items 
  
r +1, …, N, or 
  
(1− x)br + bii=r+1
N∑ .   
Table 4.  Points After Asset Transfer.  [11] 
 
Donald's Points After Transfer Ivana's Points After Transfer 







, Donald would start transferring part of the Palm Beach Mansion asset to 
Ivana so that both parties would have an equal percentage of the assets, in this case each 
party would have 72.67% of the points value, which both believe is clearly equitable and 
fair as well.    
FAIR DIVISION OF CHORES 
One of the most common issues that arise between people that live together is the 
division of household chores.  Unless both parties are dividing every task equally, 
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conflict can erupt between the parties resulting in one person doing more of the 
housekeeping or no one doing anything.   
 Unlike the division of cake or another desirable object, household chores are seen 
as an undesirable [12, p. 117].  When dividing a cake, each player wants the largest piece.  
In an undesirable, like chore division, each player now wants the smallest piece.  
However, division of chores can be solved the same way as cutting cake.   
Chores for Two 
Martin Gardner describes a scenario in the aha! Insight book.  The problem 
Gardner describes is between Janet and Buster Jones who are trying to divide a list of 
chores.  The two are arguing about the situation until Buster’s mother figures out a way 
for neither person to be saddled with only the dirty chores.  [8, p. 123].  Much like Dad in 
the cake cutting problem Mother suggests that Buster divide the chores into two lists and 
have Janet choose which list she would like to do.   
Chores for Three 
At the end of Gardner’s puzzle, Mother moves in and now the dilemma is 
determining how to split the chores between three people [8, p. 123]. 
 A three-person division of chores can be divided with one person taking a fair 
amount of a third of the chores and having the other two people divide the remaining 
chores in half via the cut and choose method.   
 Peterson and Su devise a three person chore division procedure that is similar to 
previous attempts of the moving knife algorithm.  The key difference lies in the fact that 
this new method divides the chores into six pieces rather than three.  Each player is then 
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assigned two pieces that she feels are as small as each pair received by the other players 
[12, p. 118].  First, divide the chores into three portions i, j, k using any three person, 
envy free cake cutting procedure (see Figure 2).  Each portion is then labeled i, j, k, with 
regards to the assigned player.  Second, let player i divide portion i into two pieces and 
assign those pieces to the other two players, j and k.  Third, repeat the second step for 
each player j and k.  Once all portions have been cut and distributed the procedure has 





Figure 6.  An envy free assignment of chores for three. 
  
Chores for Four 
 The 4-person chore division procedure is also a moving knife procedure that 
draws ideas from the envy free moving knife procedure for cakes [12, p. 119].  The 
protocol begins with the assumption that there are four players, Alice, Betty, Carl, and 
Debbie.  First, let Alice and Betty divide the chores into four pieces {X1, X2, X3, X4} they 
agree are equal.  Assume one piece is smaller than the others, in this case X4.  Each 
person believes the following: 
  Alice:  X1 = X2 = X3 = X4 
  Betty:  X1 = X2 = X3 = X4 









  Debbie: X4 < X1, X2, X3 
Second, let Carl and Debbie mark X1, X2, and X3, where their cuts create a tie with 
X4 as the smallest piece [12, p. 119]. 
Figure 7.  Possible markings of Step 2. 
Third, let Betty add back to one piece of the corresponding trimming to create a 
two-way tie for smallest piece.  Next, the players will choose a piece in the following 
order Alice, Betty, Carl, Debbie; with Betty required to take the added back piece if Alice 
did not.  Carl is required to choose a piece at his marking if one is available.  Thus all 
pieces will have been allocated in an envy free fashion, therefore, the last step is divide 
the trimmings.    
 
FAIR DIVISION OF RENT 
 
One of the most practical questions that arises, which mathematics can answer, is 
how to determine which room and for what amount should a housemate pay when the 
rooms have varying sizes and features [17, p. 930].   
Before this question can be answered, some background information is needed.  
First, one must understand the use of Sperner’s lemma and how, combined with 





An example of a Sperner labelled triangle is shown (Figure 8), whereby each of 
the main vertices has a different label, and the label of the vertex along an edge has to 
match one of the main vertices of the edge.    Based on the labelling, 3 elementary 
simplicies, or triangles labelled with all three labels are shown; now Sperner’s lemma can 
now be applied. 
Sperner’s lemma.  Any Sperner-labelled triangulation of a n-simplex must 
contain an odd number of fully labeled elementary n-simplicies.  In particular, 
there is at least one.   
 
Figure 8.  A Sperner labelled 2-simplex with elementary triangles marked. 
Su then discusses Simmons’ approach to cake cutting.  Simmons’ approach gives 
the player a preference of a piece if he thinks any of the other pieces are better given the 
cut-set, or the partition of the cake by a set of cuts.  Simmons’ approach also gives two 
assumptions based on the cut-set; similar assumptions will later be used for rental 
















With the combination of the lemma and the approach, Su gives a simple algorithm 
solution to the rent partition problem based on a special case of the chore division 
problem.  The dilemma is whether or not there is a fair way to divide the rooms among 
the rent.  The difference between the cake cutting dilemma and the division of rent is that 
the rooms, unlike the cake, cannot be divided and reassembled.  Very similar to chore 
division, rent partition includes dividing a bad (rent) instead of a good (cake), but since 
each person has to pay rent, it rules out the envy free of chore division.  [17, p. 938].  In 
order for each roommate to feel that his rent is fair or equitable, the Rental Harmony 
Theorem must be applied, as well as Simmons’ approach of cake cutting with cut-set 
assumptions.  
Rental Harmony Theorem. Suppose that n housemates in an n-bedroom house 
seek to decide who gets which room and for what part of the total rent. Also, 
suppose that the following conditions hold:  
(1) (Good House) In any partition of the rent, each person finds some room 
acceptable. (2) (Miserly Tenants) Each person always prefers a free room (one 
that costs no rent) to a non-free room.  
(3) (Closed Preference Sets) A person who prefers a room for a convergent 
sequence of prices prefers that room at the limiting price.  
Then there exists a partition of the rent so that each person prefers a different 
room.   
 With the addition of the Simmons approach, Sperner’s lemma comes in to play 
after the supposition of n renters and n rooms.  The rooms to be assigned are numbered 1, 
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…, n with the price of the ith room, xi, and the total rent being equal to 1.  Therefore, 
  
x1 + x2 + ...+ xn = 1 and 
  
xi ≥ 0.   
 A triangulation of this simplex with each roommate at the vertex being asked 
which room would be chosen based on the conditions.  The vertex is now labelled by the 
room choice.  In this triangulation there exists at least one pricing scheme where each 
roommate prefers a different room, thus following Sperner’s lemma! 
FAIR DIVISION OF DRAFTS 
The current draft system used has teams with the worse win-loss record picking 
first from the new crop of players.  This method is supposed to make the worse teams 
more competitive the following season  [3, p. 81].  However, there is no feasible way to 
make the draft outcome pareto-optimal with sincere choices and a series of trades among 
multiple teams.   
Although extending the draft to multiple teams has not yet been discovered, 
Dawson has found a way to minimize disadvantage between two teams.  When choosing 
players between two teams there are two methods of choice, the regular draft and the 
modified draft.  The regular draft gives the owners an option to flip a coin, with the 
winning owner, assume O1 deciding whether to choose first or let O2 choose first.  After 
that decision is made, each owner takes turns choosing a player.  In the modified draft the 
winner still decides who chooses first, but the pattern for choosing has changed.  Assume 
O1 wins the toss and decides to choose first, players picked will follow the pattern O1, O2, 
O2, O1, O1, …, O2 until no more players remain.  The problem owners face when using 
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either of these two draft choices is O1 choosing first thus having an advantage over O2 
who picks the weaker players from the pool [6, p. 82]. 
Dawson uses a classic cake cutting method to apply a modified draft among 
owners.  With the regular draft one owner has a distinct advantage over the other owner.  
Dawson’s cut and choose method minimizes the disadvantage that the second owner has 
in the talent pool [6, p.82].  The draft begins the same way, with the owners flipping a 
coin and the winner choosing role I or role II.  The winner, in this case OI, forms two 
teams from the available pool.  Then OII picks one of the teams and leaves the other team 
to OI.  The last step lets the owners take turns exchanging players in the waiver pool and 
ends when neither owner wants to make a change.  In the cut and choose protocol, it is 
suggested that the winner always take the role of OII to guarantee the maximal advantage 
by using the waiver pool [6, p. 84].  Dawson admits that the cut-and-choose method gives 
a result that is at least as good as a result as any other method gives, but does note that 




 The allocation of goods to a specified recipient is an issue that has been 
considered from many different perspectives.  This issue arises in many real-world 
situations from divorce settlements and inheritances to congressional redistricting and 
airport traffic management.  Fair division is the procedure that walks the fine balance to 
many of these sensitive subjects.   
This paper described the mathematical problem of cake cutting that started it all; 
with Steinhaus asking if it could be done, and for how many, and could it be fair?  That 
question launched a series of exploration from many different people solving it from the 
most logical to topological with elements of calculus and set theory in between.  This 
problem has been solved for a case for 2 people, and three people, and more than three 
people.  The problem of fair division has been solved with simple cuts and existence 
theorems, moving knife procedures, protocols, and matrices on computer.   
In the case of divorce, it is found that a social scientist played a part in creating 
the adjusted winner procedure to allocate assets more simply than the negotiating 
lawyers.  This method is used over and over again, not only in divorce proceedings, but 
also to help other disputes requiring assets being allocated. 
The method to divide a cake fairly can also be applied to determine how to divide 
chores, or rent, or players on team. The question that remains is, among how many 
people can this object list be divided by?  Although there was a solution for 4, can this be 
extended to 5 or more?  Again, going back to Steinhaus’ original question of, is there a 
way; can it be done? 
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What becomes apparent is that regardless of the situation, the same basic premises 
are repeated.  The underlying question in these applications is whether or not an 
allocation is truly fair?  Does the recipient feel as though she has received a proportional 
allocation of the good or is envy present? 
With regard to teaching, fair division can be looked upon to not only clarify but to 
examine the concept of division more in depth.  One of the most difficult concepts for 
elementary and middle school students to understand is that of division.  With whole 
number division students can see an item being dividing equally among a group, as long 
as the group is a multiple of the item.  However, the problem that occurs is when the item 
is being divided by a group not of that multiple.  For example, most students understand 
  
4 ÷ 4 , but have a hard time understanding the importance of the remainder in 
  
5 ÷ 4 .  
Once a student understands that the remaining piece has to be divided in a way that no 
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